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CASE COMMENTS
awarded.' 5 In one state, however, by virtue of statute, the appellate
court is required to increase the verdict and render final judgment for
the plaintiff when the jury has evidently misconstrued the instructions
with respect to the amount of compensation or has arbitrarily sought to
lighten the burden on defendant.' 6
A doctrine of modern origin, made statutory in Florida,37 grants an
appellate court the power to limit a new trial to a single issue.' 8 The
power is used with great caution in damage cases if there be any possibility
that the jury has not settled the issue of the defendant's liability inde-
pendently of the question of damages.' 9 Since there was no dispute at
the trial as to the proper elements of defendant's liabiity2 O-the employ-
ment of the broker and the securing of a bona fide purchaser who
entered into a valid sales contract with the vendor-the plaintiff would
have been entitled to a directed verdict on the question of liability.
Therefore, on appeal, this would have been a proper case for granting
a new trial limited to the question of damages:
A. L. W. STOCKTON
REAL PROPERTY: ALIENABILITY OF A POSSIBILITY
OF REVERTER
Richardson v. Holman, 33 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1948)
Land was conveyed to the traction company upon the express condi-
tion that should the grantor cease to use the land for railroad purposes,
the property would revert and pass to the grantor, his heirs, and assigns.
The grantor purported to convey his remaining interest to the plaintiffs'
predecessors. The traction company subsequently abandoned the land,
and the plaintiffs brought ejectment against the defendant, who was in
"Anderson v. Lewis, 64 W. Va. 297, 61 S. E. 160 (1908); cf. Faulkner v. Crawford,
119 Ark. 6, 177 S. W. 35 (1915); Woolf v. Hamburger, 201 Ill. App. 612 (1916); 2
Sanwicx, DAmAGEs 1165 (9th ed. 1912).
'"Glascock v. James, 183 Va. 561, 32 S. E.2d 734 (1945).
17FLA. STAT. 1941, §59.35 (Supp. 1945).
18Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Scott, 108 Miss. 871, 67 So. 491 (1915); McCoRMicK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGFS 83 (1935).
lIbid.
"Transcript of Record, Harrell v. Bishop, 33 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1948).
1
Jones: Real Property: Alienability of a Possibility of Reverter
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2021
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
possession. The lower court sustained defendant's demurrer and dis-
missed the suit. Plaintiffs appealed. HELD, the deed to the traction
company created a determinable fee, leaving a possibility of reverter
in the grantor that could be transferred to the plaintiffs. Judgment
reversed.
Although language similar to that in this reservation has been con-
strued by other courts as a right of entry for condition broken,' there is
ample authority to sustain the Florida court's construction that the interest
remaining in the grantor was a possibility of reverter.2
At common law a possibility of reverter was considered personal to
the grantor and, therefore, inalienable.3 Today, however, many states
have by statute made this interest alienable, 4 and at least two states
have reached this result in the absence of statute. 5
This is the first case in which the question of the alienability of a
possibility of reverter has come before the Florida court; and, although a
desirable result is reached, it is difficult to determine from the opinion the
real basis of the decision. The statute apparently relied upon by the
Florida court to permit the transfer of a possibility of reverter requires
that transfers of estates or any uncertain interest therein be in writing.6
'Dolby v. Dillman, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N. W. 694, 117 A. L. R. 538 (1938);
Trustees of Union College v. City of New York, 73 N. Y. Supp. 51, 65 N. E. 853 (1903).
'Irby v. Smith, 147 Ga. 329, 93 S. E. 877 (1917); North v. Graham, 325 II. 178,
85 N. E. 267, 18 L. R. A. (NS) 624 (1908); Stewart v. Blain (Tex. Civ. App.), 159
S. W. 928 (1913).
3Union Colony Co. v. Gallie, 104 Colo. 46, 88 P.2d 120 (1939); Cookman v.
Silliman, 22 Ch. 303, 2 A.2d 166 (Del. 1938); Pure Oil Co. v. Miller-Macfarland
Drilling Co., 376 M11. 4$6, 34 N. E.2d 854, 135 A. L. R. 567 (1941); North v.
Graham, 235 Ill. 178, 85 N. E. 267, 18 L. R. A. (NS) 624 (1908) ; Pond v. Douglas,
106 Me. 85, 75 AtI. 320 (1909); Magness v. Kerr, 120 Ore. 373, 254 Pac. 1012, 51
A. L. R. 1466 (1927); Atkins v. Gillespie, 156 Tenn. 137, 299 S. W. 776 (1927);
Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612).
'Kennedy v. Kennedy, 183 Ga. 432, 188 S. E. 722, 109 A. L. R. 1143 (1936);
Fall Creek Township of Madison County v. Shuman, 55 Ind. App. 232, 103 N. E.
677 (1913); Green's Adm'r v. Irvine, 23 Ky. L. 1762, 66 S. W. 278 (1902); Hamilton
v. City of Jackson, 157 Miss. 284, 127 So. 302 (1930); Kassner v. Alexander Drug
Co.. 194 Okla. 36, 147 P.2d 979 (1944); Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 155
S. E. 802, 77 A. L. R. 324 (1930).
'Slegle v. Lauer, 148 Pa. 236, 23 At. 966, 15 L. R. A. 547 (1892); Sheetz v.
Fitzwater, 5 Pa. 126 (1847); Collette v. Town of Charlotte, 114 Vt. 357, 45 A.2d
203 (1946); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §159.
6FLA. STAT. 1941, §689.01.
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It was reasoned that since transfers of uncertain interests must be in
writing, the statute contemplated that uncertain interests, including a
possibility of reverter, could be conveyed. The statute is in substantially
the same language as the third section of the original English Statute of
Frauds enacted in 1677,7 but in England a possibility of reverter was
not alienable until made so by statute in 1845.8 The Statute of Frauds
neither creates nor enlarges any estate or interest but merely prescribes
the method by which a transferable interest may be conveyed. It is,
therefore, wholly inapplicable to the problem in this case.
The result reached by the Florida court, however, can be sustained
on non-statutory grounds. Although the common law of England was
adopted by Florida, 9 and although Florida courts have scrupulously
followed the common law,1 0 this does not mean that that body of law
was irrevocably frozen as of that date so as to preclude the Florida
Supreme Court from interpreting the law in the normal manner of the
judiciary as it evolves under changing social and economic conditions.1 1
The common law rule against alienability may be traced to an inability
to conceive of a transfer of mere title or right as separate from possession,'
2
and the consequent fear of maintenance resulting from the buying up of
contingencies to stir up litigation. 13 These reasons are no longer of
practical importance.' 4 The jurist of today has no difficulty in separ-
ating ownership in fee from possession, as for example in trusts.' 5 The
laws of champerty and maintenance have required only a very limited
729 CAR. II, c. 3, §3.
'Real Property Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 6. See Copenhaver v. Pendleton,
155 Va. 463, 155 S. E. 802, 808, 77 A. L. R. 324, 332 (1930).
'FLA. STAT. 1941, §2.01.
"0See, e.g., Florida Ind. Comm. v. State, 155 Fla. 772, 784, 21 So.2d 599, 605
(1945).
"Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 185, 146 So. 234, 237 (1933); Wailer v.
First Savings & Trust Co, 103 Fla. 1025, 138 So. 780 (1931); CA~nozo, THE NATuRz
OF =H JUDIcIAL PaocEsss, Pessim.
"'See Perry v. Smith, (Tex. Civ. App.), 321 S. W. 340, 341 (1921); note, L. R. A.
1916F 311; Maitland, Mystery of Seisin, 2 LAw Q. RZ,. 481, 489, 495 (1886); Ames,
Dissesisin of Chattels, 3 HARv. L. Rzv. 23 (1890).
"See Collette v. Town of Charlotte, 114 Vt. 357, 45 A.2d 203, 206 (1946); Perry
v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 231 S. W. 340, 341 (1921); Co. Litt. 214a.
"Note, L. R. A. 1916F 311.
"See, e.g., Dolby v. Dillman, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N. E. 694, 117 A. L. R. 538,
553 (1938) (dissenting opinion).
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